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As Kaplan's study shows, the management buyout (MBO), or the as-
sets it encompasses, tend neither to remain private permanently nor be-
come public again instantaneously. But the fact of the MBO and the
existence of a substantial number of round trips within a relatively mod-
est period raise the question whether the process reflects a fundamental
problem with our legal system's arrangements for corporate governance.
Is managerial discretion thus to divert investors' assets to itself-by
shirking or by expropriating-too great?
The legal academy, and on occasion practicing lawyers like Sommer,
tend to answer that question in terms of normative or moral notions em-
bodied in the concept of fiduciary obligations. The legal system tells in-
vestors that those obligations are their entitlement. Investors reasonably
expect fulfillment of those obligations. Officers and directors presumably
are paid to maximize shareholder wealth and to refrain from appropriat-
ing from the shareholders' assets anything more than their express
compensation.
Finance economists tend to address that question in terms of effi-
ciency-which sometimes means maximizing shareholder wealth and
sometimes means maximizing social welfare. Some tests of "efficiency"
look to whether management's use of the investor's assets enhances the
latter's wealth, as measured by stock prices; others inquire whether the
MBO increases net operating returns or improves operating perform-
ance. In either case, it appears to be a matter of indifference that man-
agement takes for itself a substantial portion of the gain from that use,
notwithstanding the investors' legitimate ex ante understanding about
their entitlement to that gain.
To be sure, the lawyer is not indifferent to efficiency considerations
that occasionally are urged in support of the fiduciary obligation. And
the finance economist takes into account the moral considerations under-
lying the notion that "more is better." On a narrower level, addressed to
* Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard Law School.
Washington University Open Scholarship
614 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
lawyers' concerns, Davis and Lehn appear to offer a justification for the
MBO.
They claim that the investor does not lose in an MBO because manage-
ment does not deprive the stockholders of anything more than that of
which a third party would deprive them. But even if they are correct,
their conclusions can only justify the MBO if one assumes that manage-
ment's obligation to the investor is no greater than that of the third-party
bidder. But just that assumption is subject to debate.
Before turning to that question, I should note that Davis and Lehn's
finding of a decline; or at least no improvement, in premiums after pro-
mulgation of Rule 13e-3, suggests a depressing message about the power
of disclosure to remedy managerial overreaching of dispersed public in-
vestors. There is, of course, always the problem of the import or signifi-
cance of figures about an "average" in attempting to assess a normative
rule that should govern behavior in particular cases. But it is possible, as
both Lehn and Sommer suggest, that Rule 13e-3 disclosure is too bland,
or at any rate that its requirements are too ineffectually administered by
the SEC and by the courts, to perform its intended function. If disclo-
sure thus enforced is inadequate to remedy managerial overreaching in
transactions that are effectively coerced, or at least steeply tilted, what
remedy should be sought?
The notion that premiums are higher in "suspect" transactions than in
pure third-party transactions presents something of a puzzle. Possibly in
such suspect transactions, the bidder, having the advantage of some in-
side information, highballs the price to preempt a competitive bid.
Otherwise, the question remains as to why the self interest of rational
bidders would induce them to offer more than the lowest bid that the
inside information would require.
But the fundamental problem raised by the Davis and Lehn article
derives from their apparent premise-that the third-party bid is the mea-
sure of the propriety of the MBO premium. On that premise, common-
stock investors are not entitled to anything more than a third party
would pay for their firm's assets-as a going concern or otherwise. That
may be true if the third party takes over. In that event, any gain that it
makes above the premium paid is the result of arm's-length dealing. On
free market assumptions, the third party is not required to share that
gain with the selling stockholders.
But if management remains and puts the identical assets to more prof-
itable use by reason of its increased efforts, why is that gain not the prop-
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erty solely of the stockholders? After all, the management that we are
discussing is not exactly undercompensated to start with. To a consider-
able extent, it sets its own express compensation. The MBO phenome-
non raises the broad question whether a society that cannot induce
sufficient effort from management by such express compensation should
simply yield, and say to management: "Take whatever the market lets
you get away with."
The articles presented here raise somewhat narrower questions. We
are told that the social gains from management's taking the company
private rest in fair part on the notion that the new ownership configura-
tion furnishes management with incentives significantly to increase re-
turn, per unit of risk, and that this result makes everybody better off.
We may put to one side questions such as whether the increased debt-
equity ratio inevitable for MBOs (particularly those incurred in the late
1980s, as Kaplan and Stein have studied) indeed makes the phenomenon
a net social good, or whether the enterprise's increased profitability is a
function of the reduction of other costs (such as "improperly" reduced
capital expenditures or research and development expenditures) that re-
duce the phenomenon's social utility.
Plainly, the hypothesis of societal gain rests in fair part on the premise
that before the company went private, management was not performing
as well as it could-or as it did after the company went private-and that
management needed the incentive furnished to it by going private to per-
form at its best. Kaplan reports, however, that within a relatively brief
period the company goes public again, often within two or three years.
Kaplan's article suggests a substantial decrease in insiders and
monitors' ownership interest after the MBO goes public, notwithstanding
continued combined ownership of some forty percent of the equity. A
further breakdown of those figures-as between managers and monitors
and over the range of MBOs-would shed more light. But on the pres-
ent data, the question arises whether the enterprise's stock is resold to
public investors on the assumption of continuing optimal performance by
management that could be induced only by the ownership configuration
that results from the enterprise being private. If so, the assumption is
contrary to the premise on which the company went private. And cer-
tainly it is an assumption that raises questions about the propriety of the
company's soon going private again.
In any event, if the interests of efficiency require the going-private in-
centive structure, is there some need to restrict the magnitude of manage-
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ment's (as against stockholders') share of the resulting gains when the
enterprise goes private, and again if it later goes public? The matter
hardly lends itself to solution by contractual bargaining ex ante, at least
in the absence of the kind of explicit admonitory disclosure that no issuer
or underwriter seems willing to accept. If restrictions are to be imposed,
what substantive criteria should define them, and what process-judicial,
administrative, or other-should enforce them? Possibly a bona fide auc-
tion on going private could be prescribed. The problem for the public
investor would be less acute. But it would not be solved. And the likeli-
hood of anything approaching a bona fide auction in the complex world
of takeovers is minute.
If less than optimal effort by management and monitors is the implicit
assumption from initially going public, should that not be made clear to
the buying public? Should investors be expressly advised, in advance,
that management: (a) need not seek to maximize their wealth while a
corporation is public; and (b) can take the corporation private, but ap-
propriate for itself an indeterminate share of the corporate value? Ade-
quate explicit disclosure about such norms may enable investors to make
the free and informed choice about investing on which the market is said
to rely as an efficient appraiser of values. Will such an understanding
raise the cost of capital? If so, will that be wasteful, or at least more
costly than rules forbidding management's participating, or limiting the
extent of management's appropriating value, in MBOs?
Quite apart from the problems generated by the MBO that remains
forever private are the problems of round trips. Kaplan's study describes
significant variations in the MBO phenomenon. Those variations ad-
monish against facile prescription of uniform norms for all MBOs-at
least if factors like the duration of the private status of the MBO, or its
role in furnishing incentives to management, are the focus of attention.
But the study does suggest that some selective regulatory responses may
be appropriate in the interests of equity investors. At a minimum, the
significant number of such ventures that go public within three years
raises serious doubts that the benefits are worth the costs and invites fur-
ther inquiry, if not also some sort of regulatory response, even on
Kaplan's normative premises.
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